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Abstract: 
 
The economic and political debate in countries with older industrialization 
faces a progressive growth of social spending in relation to national products, 
generated by a concurrence of factors (aging of populations, low productivity 
in human services, moral hazard), which leads to propose reductions of social 
spending in favor of other resource allocations. Social expenditures, however, 
constitute an essential part of the “social pact” which historically united 
citizens in accepting equalities in political rights and inequalities in the 
command over resources. The question on the “sustainability” of the choices 
regarding social policies is open, with regards to the acceptability of economic 
inequalities and in relation to the ethical themes founded on the recognition of 
human dignity. 
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1.  Reasons behind social spending 
 
 
1.1  An historical premise 
 
“Social spending”1 represents, from an historical point of view, the main answer – even if not the 
only one – which contemporary market-economy States with private property of capitals (and so, 
with private property of the means of production) have given to the intrinsic inequalities of such a 
form of social and economic organization2. 
Indeed, social spending occupies a significant role also in planned economies where the means of 
production are publicly owned, because in those economies the State acquires both the burden to 
maintain the unoccupied without fault3, and a function to provide for the formation of “human 
capital” and for the essential services to the person (including housing). Yet in market economies, 
in comparison with planned economies, social spending is distinctively aimed (at least on a 
planning level) at reducing inequalities in the availability of goods and services, and so, it is entitled 
to bridge the representative democracy with universal suffrage, which assigns to each citizen equal 
power to decide (through elections), and the economic organization which, in turn, assigns to 
citizens unequal powers of “command” over real resources. 
This work refers to social spending in market economies with private property of capital. A 
preliminary observation may show that in these economies, private accumulation of savings 
configures the alternative solution to at least some of the distributive issues which social spending 
tries to solve (i.e. to the risks of old age and disease, which impede to gain an earned income). The 
contrast between such alternative solutions – private saving or social spending – or between 
different combinations of the two solutions, is a relevant theme in current debates. 
Economic history shows that in industrialized countries, and with the implied technological 
progress, productivity and employment growth lifted a relevant amount of people from a 
widespread condition of misery and general backwardness. The neo-classical economic theory, in 
its original formulation of the general economic equilibriums with their properties of optimality 
                                                 
1 Following the international literature, I define “social spending” both public transfers in money to households 
(retirement pensions, disability, survivor; disease and workers' compensations; tax reliefs and grants to households; 
unemployment benefits), and public transfers “in kind” (public healthcare, childhood and education services; public 
housing; political prices for some services; active work programs). See lately LINDBECK (2005). 
2 Another important answer to market inequalities is the regulation of work contracts. On a higher hierarchical level, 
some constitutional laws state the equality of all citizens before the law, and include some merit rights, such as a 
right to work, to health and, naturally, to life. 
3 The evaluation of individual responsibilities for the “state of need”, that is of the legitimation to obtain the social 
benefit financed by society, is an important theme for social spending. A specific theme is the “moral hazard” which 
those who apply for a social benefit may eventually exert. These topics are considered in the discussion ahead. 
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(according to Paretian criteria: efficiency in production and trade), may be interpreted as a formal 
acknowledgment and normative settlement of the potential of production and development (these 
have been formalized in neo-classical models of growth) inherent to competitive market economy. 
But, during the industrialization process, while the economic development of advanced Countries 
was proceeding, creating abyssal gaps between their average per capita income and that of the more 
underdeveloped Countries, within industrialized Countries themselves new economic inequalities 
were rising and strengthening between social groups, not only related to income or property. The 
decision power over the dynamics and quality of development4 were substantially committed to 
entrepreneurs who owned (or managed) the capitals. 
Therefore, the economic development of industrialized Countries brought, within itself, a conflict 
on the distribution of income and rose a number of questions on the role of the labor factor – as 
important as the capital factor for production processes – in regards to the decisional processes 
about rates and quality of economic development5. 
The economic theory which – after the important critical contributions of classical economists – 
consolidated itself on the definitions of the (“optimal”) conditions of efficiency in production and 
trade, and on the demonstrations of the existence of general equilibrium solutions, found itself 
forced to take note of the conflicts and inner disputes born inside “real” market economies. The 
economic theory tried to proceed toward two directions: the analysis of “market failures”, searching 
for adequate public interventions to correct them (thus providing a justification to public 
intervention in the economy); and the explicit consideration of “equity” Equity would justify 
redistributions of wealth (the initial endowments of the economic agents in a general equilibrium 
model) and of income (correcting the “efficient” distribution based on the marginal productivity of 
factors). 
Nevertheless, while in real societies the distribution of capital and income was becoming the main 
theme for social debate, the neo-classical theory found several difficulties at incorporating the 
distributive problem inside its logical and normative construction. Even accepting the validity of 
such a construction6, which allows to analytically separate efficiency from equity (this is the 2° 
fundamental welfare theorem), it was evident that a resort to an extended mechanism of lump sum 
taxes and transfers, which is necessary to change the distribution, without hampering efficiency, 
encounters overwhelming practical obstacles. On the other hand, the (forced) resort to taxes, whuch 
are assessed on the results of economic acts (income production, saving, consumption, trade, etc.), 
introduces into the normative model distortions of the “efficient” behavior of economic agents, thus 
precluding “first best” solutions and requiring “trade offs” choices between efficiency and equity7. 
                                                 
4 The neo-classical economy assumes “consumer sovereignty” as a fundamental principle: consumers lead firms to 
those production and investment choices which correspond to their preferences, through the expression of their 
choices on the markets. But, considering more critically the evolution of the populations' “lifestyles” in 
industrialized countries, it appears that such evolution has been largely guided by technological and product choices 
made by firms, which offer the kind of goods and services that consumers will consequently buy (their choices 
being mainly limited to similar products supplied under market competition). Advertising, often referred to as a 
conditioning factor of consumers' choices, is only one of the aspects of such a process. Enterprises' investment 
programs are the real driving factor of the evolution in “lifestyles”, because they bring on the consumption market 
those kinds of products and services decided by the firms. 
5 Until 1990, the confrontation between the “block” of market economies and the block of Eastern planned economies 
made it relevant a choice between these two models. In the market economy block, social spending accomplished, 
historically, a function of orienting voters' choices in favor of the market system, because it represented the concrete 
possibility to combine political and entrepreneurial freedom with a reduction of inequalities, in a way to obtain an 
acceptable degree of social cohesion. The great expansion of social spending in Western European countries from 
the end of the 2° World War, that is from the time the competition between the two blocks arose, is its most visible 
historical expression. In the United States, the first, real stimulus to social spending came from president Roosvelt, 
as one of the answers to the “Great Crisis” which threatened to overwhelm the North American market economy. 
6 A fundamental criticism to neo-classical formulation was developed by the so-called “neo-Keynesians” (and “neo-
Ricardians”) in the '50s and '60s: see for all J. ROBINSON (1956) 
7 Such difficulties are widely recognized in MUSGRAVE (1959), author of the most consistent and comprehensive 
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Moreover, logical coherence imposes that, keeping within the neo-classical model founded on the 
hypothesis of rational behavior of agents, who maximize their utility functions, the criteria used to 
decide about redistributive actions must have an utilitaristic foundation. Logical and practical 
difficulties are known to exist in regards to the construction of an utility social welfare function. So, 
neo-classical theory – which still remains the most important analytical reference for the economic 
literature – seems inadequate to explain the redistributive issue. However this does not mean that 
individual utilitarism is useless in interpreting the behavior of economic agents and States (as 
discussed in more depth in the following sections). 
 
 
 
1.2  Different approaches to “social equity” 
 
Within the studies of “social spending”, the most common critical observations on the explanatory 
and normative capacity of the neo-classical approach on distribution, pointed at its individual 
utilitaristic foundations. It has been argued, analyzing historical evolution, that the stimuli which 
fueled social redistributive claims are not ascribable to individual utilitarism (utility is function of 
income), but to political dialectics between social groups. Synthetically speaking, political parties 
which represented middle and low classes would have accepted a market economy with private 
property of capital, intrinsically generating distributive inequality, because they would have 
obtained redistributive policies in such a way to reduce those areas of greater poverty, and to offer 
to laborers a social network of protection against most risky events (old age, sickness, disablement 
and invalidity, survivors, unintentional unemployment). Moreover, they would have obtained the 
public provision, free of charge (or partially free) at the point of need, of a number of social services 
which are considered fundamental (especially healthcare and school). This historical-political 
approach seems to exclude the utilitaristic schemes adopted by traditional economic theory. But this 
is not necessarily true for all the trends of study in the field of political behavior of social groups. A 
relevant exception is represented by “public choice” studies, which look for the motivations behind 
the actions of specific social groups (governments, bureaucracies, political parties), through specific 
utility functions which include not only income, but also indicators of power and of “status”: there 
still remains the hypothesis according to which each group maximizes its utility function. A 
significant extension is given by studies on the motivations of a median voter, to interpret and 
forecast electoral results and their relevance in regards to the choices of social spending8. 
Within those traditions which are defined in literature as “alternative” to utilitarism, much interest 
followed those which stress the role of “ideals”, or universal ethical principles, as determinants of 
the redistributive demand. Between such principles, the ideal of “social justice” stands out since  
                                                                                                                                                                  
treaty of the neo-classical theory of public finance, which explicitly refers to the interferences of the distributive 
branch with the allocative one of the public budget. To the economist who, instead, denies the neo-classical 
distribution theory, it is logically wrong to search for redistributive “interferences” with the allocative processes, 
because distribution and allocation would be two logically inseparable components of the market economy's model 
(prices which direct allocative decisions of firms, are the same prices which are composed of the remunerations of 
factors: a change of the profit rate or of the wage rate, resulting from distributive conflicts, changes the structure of 
prices and therefore the related “signals” that market sends to economic agents to drive them to an efficient 
allocation of resources). 
8 Recently, the “aging” of the median voter attracted the attention of researchers. This aging process may lead to 
prefer – within the sphere of social spending – pension systems which favor old cohorts in comparison with younger 
and active groups. See for example: BERGSTROM, HARTMAN (2004). Using a sample of 24 countries, 
MILANOVIC (2000) tried to verify the hypothesis that the median voter evaluates his net gain from redistributions, 
and consequently how this affects redistributive policies. The hypothesis appears statistically weak, especially if 
only strictly redistributive expenditures are taken into account (that means excluding pensions). On the other hand, 
including expenditures in kind appears to strengthen it. The author also shows that the median voter's influence on 
economic policy choices in representative democracies is less direct than commonly believed. 
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ancient times. But a concrete specification of such a notion of “social equity” is not obvious9. 
A turning point in the theoretical approach to social policies took place in the '70s, when proposals 
to build a “social state” were already experimented in some countries with significant results. At 
that time in some studies, reasons of (partial) dissatisfaction arose with the practice of targeting 
social policies only toward economic objectives, in other terms the provision to every citizen of 
specific “primary” (or “merit” or necessary to the realization of equal opportunities) goods. Studies 
by Rawls, Marshall, Sen10, marking a deeper conceptual parting from the welfarist tradition, 
highlighted qualitative aspects of welfare, which may be summarized with the assumption that 
every person (equality) has to be able to choose (freedom) his project of life, integrated into a social 
organization. Such a vision of social welfare, it has been pointed out, aims to the “human 
development” rather than to correct “market failures”. The objective of “human development” 
transcends the development of GDP, which in turn characterizes a product-oriented vision of 
welfare, and which still today imprints economic policies of economically advanced States11. 
A dignity for labor, going beyond its interpretation as a production factor, and a complete 
participation for everyone to social life beyond widespread situations of substantial alienation, all 
become final objectives of a social policy whose success is not measurable only in terms of GDP 
growth. Such a vision of “human development” assumes and incorporates previous demands for a 
distribution of primary goods and services to all citizens and the enactment of procedural equity 
rules, since it still remains necessary that everyone is allowed the instruments required to achieve 
one's life project. But the vision of social welfare defined by “human development” intends to go 
beyond such needs of social policy, toward an extension of individual capacity to promote his 
personal potential, and realize new levels of freedom inside social organizations. As such, this 
vision encompasses not only the “welfare” of the poor and weak social groups, but it proposes itself 
to every citizen to develop their capacities. 
 
 
 
1.3 A critical evaluation of different approaches to social “equity” 
 
An evaluation of non-utilitaristic motivations to social spending requires drastic simplifications and 
a synthesis of the enormous existent literature. I will therefore focus on the most qualifying aspects 
of the trends which encountered wider favor. 
The historical approach which explains the evolution of social spending policies as a result of a 
dialectic between social groups, may be objected noting how such approach is insufficient to 
                                                 
9 A first question regards the distinction between “consequential” or “procedural” equity. The first type of equity 
considers redistributive results obtained from social policies, so the studies based on it share the presence of a 
wished level of economic equality: they can range from egalitarian social welfare functions (Rawlsian, maximin) 
until the “merit goods” thesis (Musgrave) and the “specific egalitarianism” (Tobin) which, instead, reduce the space 
of required equality to a given set of goods and services which should be supplied to everyone and financed by 
society (healthcare, education, goods which are necessary to live). “Procedural equity”, on the other hand, requires 
that society guarantees to all individuals equal opportunities to exert their capacities within social organization. It 
therefore implies both a supply to everyone of the fundamental services to cultural and professional education, and 
the enactment of rules to safeguard and promote social mobility and merit recognition. It may be stated therefore 
that both the adhesion to objectives of a consequential or procedural equity, require social spending programs, 
essentially destined to the sectors of education (also higher education) and work training, healthcare, and availability 
for everyone of primary goods and services. But, contents and instruments for such programs may differ, in relation 
to the chosen objective. The choice for consequential equity tends to formulate more invading redistributive 
programs in market economies (for example, taxes which distort economic incentives). The choice for procedural 
equity might be considered as an act of trust in the market, as long as everyone is allowed to express at their best 
their possibilities. 
10 RAWLS (1971); MARSHALL (1973); SEN (1970; 1975; 1982; 1985; 1996; 2000; 2002). 
11 See the intellectually provocative report on welfare by BOSI (2002). 
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construct a normative theory, and to recognize the political drivers behind redistributive 
interventions. But such an approach highlights that the root of social spending demands is found in 
the “pacts” which constitute state organizations, when those “social pacts” include inequalities 
between citizens inherent to market economies with privately owned capital, and thus they also 
include “corrections” (public interventions) to inequalities. A “social pact” is, by definition, an 
agreement between social groups and any agreement presupposes a definition of an equilibrium (or 
an arrangement) between conflicting interests (the analysis of classical economists identified the 
subdivision of social groups with different interests in capitalists, rentiers, and workers). In this 
approach, normative suggestions show a significance as they express a political choice (value 
judgment) in favor of a given set of solutions to the dialectics between social groups. The Marxian 
one, for instance, is an extreme choice because it requires the elimination of private property of 
capital and, as a consequence, of the capitalists and rentiers classes. Within the field of those who 
accept a private property of capital (safeguarded by the State born from the “social pact”), decisions 
on the amounts and forms for social interventions are entrusted to the decisional process of public 
budget formation. Under a normative profile, to ask – in a given country, in a selected historical 
time – more (or less) extended social interventions means to express distributive choices and so, a 
priority between alternative destinations of available resources. 
It is just the case to note how such choices for public budgets, which reflect – within the limits of 
decisional processes in parliament-based democracies – the majority preferences of the “sovereign 
people”, also reflect priority choices referable to individual utilitarism logics (think about the 
diffuse resistances by taxpayers-voters to give up higher fractions of their disposable income to 
finance new social expenditures. This theme is discussed later). Going back to the roots of the 
“social pact”, a normative instruction may be found in the constraint which limits social spending 
reductions above the safeguard level of such a pact, because under that level the unfavored socio-
economic classes might consider the pact broken (historical cases of revolutionary movements are 
known). 
The historical-political approach does not allow to go beyond an investigation of the contents of the 
“social pact”, and of possible demands of modification in regards to the evolution of existing social 
organizations. It does not allow to express “moral” judgments on the conflicting ideologies and 
interests, focusing instead on the historical outcomes of such conflicts and on the causes provoking 
those outcomes. Those who recall specific “ethical” (or religious) principles which, on the other 
hand, are supposed to guide human behavior, intend to go further and to provide an answer to the 
question why some people and social groups pretend a given organization of society is superior to 
the others. In the previous paragraph I reminded the recent “social justice” theses mostly applied for 
the proposition of social policies: the theses by Rawls, Marshall, Sen in particular (see note number 
9), which configure “primary rights” (of “citizenship”) for everyone to obtain a given set of goods 
and services, supposed to be required (but not sufficient) to realize the principle of “freedom” and 
the objectives of “human development”. 
Some economists underline the fact that those “principles”, since they imply value judgments, are 
not analytically comparable between them nor with the principles of individual utilitarism, and for 
this reason the economic analysis should stop upon facing their statement (limiting itself to an 
examination of the economic effects of the provisions inspired by such principles). As a matter of 
fact, an evaluation of these principles and their implications appears mandatory when the 
motivations for social spending are sought. I will argue in the following discussion that an insight of 
such motivations is a necessary requirement for the evaluation of the “sustainability” of social 
spending12. 
                                                 
12 As I am going to argue, if the conclusion is reached that social spending is – within some limits – an essential factor 
for the “sustainability” of the market economy system with privately owned capital, then social spending is – within 
those limits – “sustainable” by definition. The question turns upside down and asks under which level of social 
spending the risk of surviving for a given system, in a given historical period, may prove positive. 
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In case “value judgments” which refer to a (or a set of) ethical principle(s) of social justice are 
accepted, a number of difficulties arise and may impede to obtain, from such principles, concrete 
specifications for social policies operative choices. 
A first difficulty, conceptual in nature, concerns the universality which by definition relates to 
ethical principles. Indeed such principles need to be interpreted as valid for the whole humanity, 
and not limited to restricted social ambits as opposed to the entire world population. To exemplify, 
if the application of these principles through social spending was limited to the number of most 
industrialized countries – building only in these countries for them universal and egalitarian welfare 
systems, aimed at protecting against social risks and poverty, and with a public provision of 
healthcare, education, housing and other primary services – but at the same time the majority of 
humanity was left in poverty and underdevelopment, the intrinsic feature of universality of these 
“ethical” (or religious) principles would be betrayed. 
The reference to “sovereignty” of each State would not be appropriate to justify the violation of the 
ethical principle on an universal scale, because transfers of resources (“international aid”) which 
most advanced States may provide to underdeveloped countries are subject to explicit choices of 
their public budget policy. In budget policies the allocation of transfers to poorer countries compete, 
indeed, both with alternative public uses (and between them, also the internal “social spending”) 
and with private uses of the resources (as affected by the level of internal taxation). The scarcity of 
the “aid” from advanced to backward countries, in comparison with alternative destinations of 
private and public resources13, is the demonstration that public budget policies of the advanced 
countries, even though they provide ample resources to the internal social spending, cannot be 
considered compliant with the “ethical” principles considered above, because they do not respect 
the essential principle of universality14. 
A second difficulty in translating “ethical” principles into concrete actions of social policy regards 
the quantification of such interventions, a fundamental moment of the expenditure choices because 
it requires a definition of the scale of priority for social expenditures in comparison with other uses 
of public and private resources. 
A typical case is the healthcare policy, which supporters of the ethical principles (specific 
egalitarianism, citizenship rights, human development capacity) affirm should be directed primarily 
to the objective of satisfying the “needs” of health15, in compliance with the criteria of universal 
accessibility, gratuity of the services at the point of need, of equal treatment of equal needs. But, 
how these “needs” are supposed to be quantified inside public budgets? 
In the real world, the health “needs” are defined by medical decisions. Doctors make diagnoses and 
choose therapies16, while the costs for operations express their production functions. In the abstract 
neo-classical world, the allocative efficiency is reached because it is supposed that all agents 
maximize their utility functions (their income) and that the prices of production factors are 
determined by their marginal productivity. Besides, all agents have at their disposal complete 
informations, they operate in absence of uncertainty and in perfectly competitive markets17. 
It is known that such hypotheses are not verified in the observable reality. The relationships 
between doctors and patients, pharmaceutical manufacturers and doctors, purchasers and providers, 
                                                 
13 Currently E.U. States assign about 0.5% of GDP to developing countries. 
14 An analysis of the forms of such aid to poor countries (in money, in goods and services, in transfers of technologies 
and know-how, in direct productive initiatives, in favorable trade and tariff policies, etc.), and of the choice of 
recipients (States, non governative organizations, and others) goes beyond the scopes of this work. 
15 See for all OLIVER (2005), who reminds that Labour party in its electoral program in 1997, when it came back to 
government, affirmed that the only aim of medical policies should have been to satisfy health “needs”. 
16 In medical economics research it has been observed that also public healthcare systems which are inspired to the 
principle of “need” tend to put an emphasis on curing medicine, ignoring the stages of prevention and timely 
verification of pathology, in a way that makes successive therapeutic stages more difficult and costly. 
17 It is known that the model of “efficient” general equilibriums requires more restrictive assumptions, which further 
complicate the transition from the abstract normative model to concrete programs of intervention. 
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are conditioned by asymmetric information, and a “moral hazard” is easily presumable. Even more 
important, conceptually and operatively, production factors prices (the remunerations for healthcare 
services operators, profits and wages of the enterprises) are not determined according to their 
marginal productivity. 
The above-mentioned criticisms to the Paretian definition of efficiency make the quantification of 
social “needs” problematic, in the example of health “needs”. Given the same amount of healthcare 
services, a new contractual agreement which rises wages and salaries for the operators of this 
sector, also rises the quantification of the “needs”, and so, of the public expenditure which has to 
satisfy them. The “Baumol disease” is known, which brings to inflate public services costs having a 
social (redistributive) purpose, determining as time goes by increases of the fraction of income 
devoted to such social expenditures18. 
For these reasons, a reference to “needs” to determine social spending, as it should be derived from 
the above-mentioned “ethical” principles, appears for many concrete reasons (in the example 
provided for the healthcare policy), inadequate to quantify social policy interventions. This is an 
important limitation, because the question of the “sustainability” of social spending resolves 
substantially around those decisions related to the quantity of social expenditure, compared to the 
quantities destinated to alternative uses of the available resources. 
 
 
 
2.  Social policies: redistribution in money or in kind? 
 
I recalled before that, independently of any conventional definition, social policies are identifiable 
because they aim at redistributive objectives, changing the distribution of real resources (of the 
powers to “command” over the uses of such resources) which would otherwise result from the 
actions of free markets and from the initial distribution of property rights. Social policies are, as 
such, bound to face a preliminary choice whether to adopt redistributive interventions in “money” 
or in “kind”. It is indeed possible, with a decision exogenous to the market, to assign resources to 
the people who are supposed to have inadequate availability, by transferring money to them, or by 
offering them some goods and services at no charge at the point of need (financed by the general 
public). 
Those economists who are convinced about the superiority of the decisions taken in competitive 
markets – where, accepting the many limiting assumptions on which the general equilibrium theory 
is built, solutions of an “optimal” equilibrium may be obtained – affirm that redistribution must be 
mainly done in money, so as the recipient may maximize his utility under a higher budget 
constraint. A redistribution in kind tends, on the other hand, to violate the basic principle of 
consumer sovereignty - which is fundamental for the neo-classical construction19 - as free choices 
of consumers are mandatory requirements of an efficient resource allocation. 
Indeed, in a neo-classical world a redistribution in kind may find a reason only as a form of 
intervention against “market failures”, such as a presence of near-public goods, information 
asymmetries or moral hazard20, or other imperfections of real markets depart from the purely 
competitive model. So, redistribution in kind remains in a position of theoretical inferiority in 
comparison with redistribution in money (which the 2° fundamental welfare theorem refers to). 
Under a normative view, the proposals of a redistribution in kind should be sustained by choices 
drawn from an utilitaristic social welfare function, while the usual non-utilitaristic motivations 
                                                 
18 See BAUMOL (1967); LINDBECK (2005); NIXON, ULMANN (2006). 
19 See. MUSGRAVE (1959), pp. 13 and subsequents. 
20 See the analyses by MUNRO (1992), and BLACKORBY, DONALDSON (1988) who, with regards to health 
services, show that under asymmetrical information and other assumptions, the redistribution “in kind” may result 
more efficient, under Paretian criteria, than redistribution in money. 
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(specific egalitarianism, etc.) to such redistributive actions would not be logically compatible with 
the utilitaristic neo-classical construct and with the “welfarist” criteria of defining efficient 
solutions21. 
The alternative approaches, assigning a higher priority to a redistribution in kind in social spending 
programs, start from the objection to the neo-classical theory assumptions, or to some qualifying 
aspects of it. They reject the idea that the economic agents' behavior (both public and private) only 
obeys to utilitaristic motivations, because in such a vision it is ignored the role of values such as the 
recognition of a centrality of the person in every activity, the altruism, the awareness to belong to a 
social organization, which are all fundamental drivers of the human behavior. I noted in previous 
paragraphs that the majority of those theories which consider economic decisions as founded (also) 
on non-utilitaristic motivations, result in prescriptions in favor of social spending in kind 
(healthcare, school and formation, direct assistance, programs for labor, provision at no charge or at 
political prices of some goods and services considered essential to the person). 
A different objection to the principle of consumer “sovereignty” highlights the meaning of such 
“sovereignty”, since it would not be fully free, but instead conditioned by limited informations a 
consumer is able to obtain. This consideration to the conditioning effects of advertising on the real 
freedom of consumers choice dates back to the '20s and '30s, with the researches on market 
imperfect forms. Warnings about the inability of consumers to realize their preferences are already 
found in the classical economists22. More recent studies on information asymmetries have extended 
and deepened the reasons for doubting on the consumer “sovereignty” in many markets. 
The neo-classical economist may answer back by observing that such causes of “market failures” 
and the proposition of economic and regulatory interventions to correct them23, remain inside the 
Paretian logic and of the welfare economics. But the recognition of such market failures, which 
express imperfect consumer choices, may open the way to a social spending in kind, since it 
substitutes the allocative decisions of the consumer with those taken in public budgets. 
When formulating the category of “merit goods”, Musgrave acknowledged they represented 
“deviations” from the basic principle of consumer sovereignty, and tried to reduce their importance 
and extension in his normative theory (which is explicitly neo-classical) of public finance24. The 
distrust against social spending programs in kind (public provision of goods and services) which is 
found in some literature and in economic policy debates25, shows indeed deep theoretical roots. For 
many authors, consumer “sovereignty” is the demonstration that in systems founded on political 
democracy it is possible to realize an economic democracy through free competitive markets26. 
                                                 
21 The logical incompatibility between an evaluation of actions motivated by non-utilitaristic criteria and the 
evaluation of their effects under the Paretian criteria is already recognized in MUSGRAVE (1959), pp. 9 ,13, 21, 
133-5. See also ARACHI (1993) and the authors cited in his work. 
22 See the citation of SIDGWICK (1891) in STEVE (1976). 
23 The establishment of “consumer unions” is an empirical sign of the lacking of informations to individual consumers. 
24 MUSGRAVE (1959), as noted in previous note n. 19 and at p. 89. 
25 An uncertainty is widespread and visible in political (and also of trade unions') authorities and leaderships of many 
countries, about the choice to assign to low and medium income rentiers new public transfers in money and higher 
fiscal reductions, or to give them benefits through social public expenditures in goods ans services (healthcare, 
education, public housing, political prices for some goods and services, etc.). 
26 Policies for healthcare services in contemporary advanced societies offer some representative examples of the 
difficulties encountered when trying to reconcile a redistribution in kind with the principles rooted in mainstream 
economic theory. It may be noted that: still today (Spring 2008) the United States keep a privately managed 
healthcare system (even though corrected by public programs in favor of old cohorts and the poor); in other 
countries, and also in the E.U. (for example in Federal Germany), the health system is organized and managed 
according to the mutualistic model based on labor relations, and they accept that citizens with middle to high income 
opt out not participating in the mandatory social insurance. In those countries which chose the public healthcare 
model, universal and egalitarian, spaces are searched to let some freedom to consumer choices and occasions to 
introduce “near-market” forms: “tickets” are introduced to re-establish a relevance for income in consumer choices; 
complementary and supplementary private assurances are encouraged (a theoretical paradox may be seen in United 
Kingdom, homeland of the public healthcare service, where the majority of health economists follow the utilitaristic 
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It would therefore seem that the mentioned criticisms to the consumer “sovereignty” principle 
intended to highlight some limitations for its application to real world systems, rather than to 
question its fundamental role for determining resource allocation, which would substantially be 
governed by consumer preferences. Instead a deeper criticism, often overlooked in literature, does 
not accept that resource allocation decisions may be traced back to (free) sovereign consumer 
choices. 
The problem is whether consumer choices (subject to their budget constraints, in other words to the 
distribution of wealth) stem out of “innate” preferences, and to what extent, or instead those 
preferences are influenced or generated by the decisions of enterprises, which choose what goods 
and services to offer on the market. Behind the supply of goods and services, indeed, there are the 
decisions of enterprises as to what direction research should pursue (and be financed for) in order to 
provide new products, or modifications of existing products, and which investments are to be 
undertook to enlarge or innovate supply, until large-scale commercialization. Such decisions of the 
enterprises and their timing, reflect not only technological progress, but also a competitive action 
between firms and sectors, and they consider economic constraints of fixed capital depreciation and 
selling of inventories. 
The production system aim namely at creating between consumers a consensus, necessary to 
convalidate production choices – from research to commercialization –, and this fact is much more 
relevant than advertising strictu sensu. Consumer tastes are (at least partially) oriented, molded, 
modified by firms which act, in their role of enterprises27, also in the fields of mass information, 
free time activities and in those which are functional to handle social relations. A web of activities 
and interests, having objectives and constraints that are commercial in nature (as the invested 
capital must at least earn the market rate of return), operates to build, spread and make it prevail 
among consumers those “models and styles of life” which need, to be followed, those types of 
goods and services decided by the production system, which invested in them (anticipating 
necessary capitals to research, development, production, commercialization). 
It seems to me, therefore, that the statement market economies would be dominated by consumer 
“sovereign” choices may point to one of the variables (the innate preferences) explaining resource 
allocation in contemporary market economy systems. But at the same time, the decisions of 
enterprises, proposing and realizing those goods and services which are functional to the 
“lifestyles” proposed and spreaded by the firms themselves, are equally, and even more, important 
defining variables. Such a complex system of decisions is completed with collective choices which 
influence resource allocation, either directly (public consumption and investment) or indirectly 
(through taxation and transfers in money, and also through regulation). 
If such a complex decisional model of the use of resources in contemporary market economies is 
accepted, the statement that consumer sovereignty governs the allocation of  resources in such 
economic systems consequently fails; and it also fails the corollary according to which public 
redistribution has to favor money transfers, in order to be compatible with the principles upon 
which the system is founded. Moreover, the criticism of “paternalism”28 moved against public 
supply of goods and services does not prove valid, since it would substitute consumer sovereignty 
with the political process forming public budgets. In contemporary social organizations with market 
economy, the resource allocation is not traceable back to a single decisional set (the exogenous 
consumer preferences), but instead to a multitude of decisional sets, being significant also those of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
approach). 
27 They are, indeed, enterprises which invest private capitals and follow the rules of any other commercial enterprise. 
28 The criticism of “paternalism” to social spending programs, which substitute public to consumer choices, has deep 
implications in regards to resource allocation, because it rises the question of democratic (substantial) legitimacy of 
the majority group's power to take the place of individuals in their consumer choices. The fear is also to legitimate, 
in such a way, the action of single groups of interest may try to manipulate the “paternalistic” role of the State in 
affirming their beliefs or interests about how citizens should operate their choices. See STIGLITZ (2005) pp. 69, 70. 
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enterprises and of public authorities. 
Redistributive transfers in money leave the allocative decisions to consumers and, behind them, to 
the strategic choices of enterprises, which orient consumers toward those purchases which validate 
investment and production choices of the firms themselves. Transfers in kind are decided through 
political procedures, which are distinguished from consumer choices based on individual 
utilitarism, and from the strategies of firms looking for the profitability of invested capital. Both 
forms of redistributive transfers, in money or in kind, are legitimate candidates to be used within 
market economy societies. 
This conclusion opens the way to a research of different arguments to be offered as a reference for 
choices of social spending policy, on which the debate is still alive today. 
 
 
 
2.1  The “sustainability” of social spending in current debate 
 
In an important contribution on this theme, Lindbeck29 detects five fundamental factors which 
induced and allowed a relevant increase in social spending in developed countries30, in the period 
between the end of the '40s and the first half of the '70s: (1) the constraint imposed by international 
economic interdependencies, which is still weak; (2) relatively small unit costs of production for 
human services provided by the public sector; (3) a favorable demographic ratio between active and 
inactive workforce, and the swift growth of labor productivity and, so, of the taxable economic 
base; (4) a low unemployment rate; (5) the still limited effects of tax wedges and “moral hazard”. 
From the '70s ahead, these factors would have affected more relevantly the economic systems' 
ability of developed countries to “sustain” social spending growth, until a point where they started 
to constitute bonds which today, and in the forecasts for future years, would bring the question to 
the governments - in dimensions which cannot be disregarded and with a time schedule which 
cannot be postponed anymore – about if, and how, social spending growth inherited by previous 
decades is still sustainable. 
Lindbeck separates the above-mentioned factors between those which are totally or mainly 
exogenous to social spending processes (those are the factors marked with n. 1 and 2) and the ones 
with stronger endogenous features, meaning that they significantly reflect behavioral reactions of 
private agents to social spending processes (factors number 3 and 4), or are fully endogenous by 
definition (factor n. 5). Such a distinction between exogenous or endogenous factors threatening the 
“sustainability” of social spending is undoubtedly relevant. 
Nevertheless, in this article I prefer to stress the distinction between factors which stimulate, 
demand-side, an increase of social spending, and factors which determine supply-side the capacity 
of the economic system to provide real resources required to satisfy demands (both potential and 
                                                 
29 LINDBECK (2005). In the vast literature analyzing leading (and limiting) factors of the remarkable social spending 
growth between the  '60s and the '80s, see LINDERT (1996) where the main explicative models are reviewed. In an 
attempt to forecast future (up to year 2020) tendencies of social spending, the author underlines the impact of 
demographic growth and of “deadweight” factors represented by administrative costs and efficiency distortions. 
30 As in Lindbeck's analysis, this paragraph substantially considers the experiences of Western Europe countries (E.U., 
before the new entries of former planned economy countries), omitting the peculiarities of the United States socio-
economic system in comparison with Europe. Anyway, many of the considerations are still applicable also to the 
U.S.. A comparison of U.S. and E.U. redistributive policies is found in ALESINA, ANGELETOS (2003), where the 
influence due to different prevailing views on the causes of economic inequalities (whether they reflect different 
skills and labor commitment, or they depend from exogenous factors such as inheritances, social and political 
relationships, and also operative open-mindedness) are examined. It should be noted here that in a previous work, 
ALESINA, GLAESER, SACERDOTE (2001) highlighted how racial prejudice makes redistributive policies less 
appealing to large voting categories, because the poor are relatively more common within Afro-American 
communities. They also observe how the North American political system limits the rise of a party representative of 
the poorer classes (differently from the historical events observed in Europe). 
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effective) for social spending31. The incomplete capacity of supply, in a given historical moment, to 
satisfy (in real terms) social spending demands generates their “rationing”, under usual schemes of 
micro- and macroeconomics theory. 
I believe that the best starting point of this analysis is the interpretation of the concept of 
“sustainability” for social spending. Currently adopted notion, in literature and in public choices for 
budget policies, refers to a specific ratio between public debt and GDP which should remain 
substantially stable over a medium-long term. Indeed this is the notion of intertemporal 
“sustainability” of the public budget policy, such it is acknowledged by the E.U. and to which 
Member States bounded themselves under the “stability pact”. It appears immediately applicable to 
social spending, because its notable growth in public budgets between '40s and '70s, and the levels 
reached by it (more than 60% of total public spending on average in E.U. countries and in the 
United States)32, mean that a continuation of such a dynamics for “social spending” would run into 
the “sustainability” constraint of budget policy. 
Since, on the other hand, those factors which contributed to social spending growth still operate in 
advanced societies (recently it added to them the effect of populations aging), the question of 
“sustainability” for public budget is more and more identified, in theoretical and political debates, 
with that of social spending “sustainability”, since it is the most important and dynamic element of 
public expenditures. Moreover, this substantial identification between the “sustainability” of public 
budget and social spending, also reflects the widespread idea that the economic use of resources in 
production activities (private and public) is the requirement which allows to distribute a part of the 
domestic product to those who did not contribute to produce it (the receivers of social benefits). So, 
even in public budget policies the expenses devoted to sustain or accomplish investments and 
production of goods and services, would have a higher logical priority in comparison with 
redistributive social expenditures33. 
It seems to me that such a notion of “sustainability” of social spending should be carefully 
                                                 
31 There are interrelations between factors of demand and supply, which I will point out later in the text, but the 
arguments I am going to discuss will show that this conceptual distinction is important, both for the analysis of 
“sustainability” and for implications to be drawn for public budget policies. 
32 See LINDBECK (2005), p.2 
33 This argument should not be applicable to public social expenditures which, directly or indirectly, contribute to the 
formation and qualitative enhancing of human capital, which is a production factor: expenditures for education and 
professional training, for healthcare and for goods and services essential to a laborer's productive capacity. The 
investment productivity of resources (especially those devoted to education) redirected by redistributive policies to 
agents with higher credit-constraints is examined in BÉNABOU (2000). The author finds that, comparing a society 
with higher inequality and lower redistribution with another society which features lower inequality and higher 
redistribution, the forecast on which one will reach faster income growth depends on the combined result of two 
counter-balancing effects, that is, distortions to incentives caused by redistributions, and higher productivity brought 
by social investments. However, in the debates these distinctions are often ignored, and a dialectical shortcut is used 
according to which “it cannot be redistributed that which was not produced” (assigning all “redistribution” to social 
spending), and “the best way to help the poor is to make the national product grow adequately”, because in this way 
redistribution is eased (on such arguments see also STIGLITZ, 2005, pp. 66 and subsequents). On the other hand, it 
may be presumed that, in the current historical period, the dampening of attention to the contribution many social 
expenditures give to the formation and quality of human capital reflects, more or less consciously, the observation 
that emerging countries in international economy, and especially in Asia (China, India and others), put the 
“competitiveness” of traditionally more advanced countries to the test, thanks to their lower labor costs (inclusive of 
social contributions). The relative backwardness of social spending in emerging countries and a lower quality of life 
for their laborers do not seem – currently – to impede that in those countries labor is exerted in conditions of very 
high productivity. Indeed, in such emerging countries those social expenditures which are more tied to the formation 
of human capital – i.e. for education, professional training and research – are strongly selective (aimed at forming 
future leading and technical classes in various sectors of activity) rather than “universal” as it is desired in E.U. 
countries (and, partially, in the United States). Lastly, the comparison between the contribution to national product 
of private employments of resources and that of public employments is made difficult by the fact that the former is 
evaluated at market prices, while the latter is evaluated at factor cost: on this theme see the exhaustive observations 
by STEVE (1976). 
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considered. The economic founding of the concept of “sustainability” is the technological frontier 
of possible productions, which imposes a rationing of potential demands, private and public, in a 
way to respect the supply constraint imposed by the availability of production factors (capital, 
labor, non-reproducible commodities “by means of commodities”) and of known and economically 
efficient technologies. But, there are n combinations of utilization for production factors which 
respect the general supply constraint, so the “sustainability” cannot be the criterion for choosing 
between such possible combinations. The “stability pact” agreed between E.U. member countries is 
an explicit confirmation of the understanding of the economic meaning of “sustainability”. The 
intertemporal bond for public budgets is, indeed, proportioned to the balance deficit (flux) and to 
the existent debt (stock), and not to the ratio between private and public consumptions, nor to the 
“social public spending” category. From a practical point of view, the E.U. “stability pact” imposes 
to member countries to finance public spending (of any kind) through a simultaneous reduction of 
private spending (increasing taxation), so as to globally maintain the utilizations (private and public, 
for consumption and for investment) within the bonds of production supply. The choices about 
dimensions and compositions of public budgets are left to the collective (political) decisions inside 
each individual country34. 
Thus said, nothing impedes that a single E.U. member country decides to have a higher ratio – in 
comparison with the E.U. average – between social spending and global public spending, and/or 
between them and national product, as long as the higher public social expenditures are financed 
with correspondent taxation (or, which is the same, with a reduction of disposable incomes for 
private uses), or with compensating reductions of other public spending categories. 
Decisions about social spending policy cannot therefore be referred exclusively to the notion of 
“sustainability”, which imposes the global bond of an equilibrium (at current prices, to avoid a 
rationing by inflation) between global demand and supply, but it does not offer choice criteria 
between the n possible allocative outcomes for production factors and their relative distributive 
structures. To exemplify using the same terms as current political debates: is it acceptable an 
increase of social spending financed by an increase of taxation of those private consumptions which 
are not strictly necessary? Is it acceptable to give up new social spending to finance a reduction of 
taxation on labor and capital incomes? These examples which have been taken from the observation 
of political debates around E.U. countries, may last a long time and lead to a rethinking on the 
priority scales effectively adopted in budgets formation, not only in regards to the dimensions of 
them (of the taxation), but also in regards to the destinations of spending decisions between 
different expense categories (even within the same “social spending” category). 
In the view of the researcher in economics, and particularly in public economics, the weaknesses of 
the neo-classical normative theory arise (see previous paragraphs), even though it offers the 
analytical apparatus still prevailing in literature. It is known that the attempts to build a social 
utilitaristic welfare function met (until today) insuperable practical and theoretical obstacles, so the 
field of collective choices which determine dimensions and compositions of public budgets remains 
outside of the neo-classical model, and the same is true for the global structure of allocation and 
distribution of production resources throughout the system. On the other hand, the introduction 
inside the normative theory of “non-utilitaristic points of views”35 on income distribution – such as 
“merit goods”, “specific egalitarianism”, “human development capacity”36 - offer to public action 
                                                 
34 With this formulation, the E.U. is also neutral in regards to public enterprise, as long as it respects market 
regulations. 
35 See ROSEN (2003), pp. 98 and subsequents. FEHR, FISCHBACHER (2002), recalling the many contributions from 
previous authors (already in A. SMITH, 1759), vigorously criticize a tendency shown by a part of the economic 
literature to forget that in the fields of social choices, of negotiations and of incentives to market decisions, the 
selfish interest is not sufficient alone to explain agents' preferences. The authors propose the hypothesis that 
reciprocal fairness in such fields influence preferences more than traditional selfish motivations. See also FONG 
(2002). 
36 See authors cited under par. 1.2. 
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perspectives which are not (individually) utilitaristic, but rather solidaristic and moral, and thus of a 
too general kind to be used as practical choice criteria for the dimensions and structures of social 
spending policies. That is, and again to exemplify, which criteria derived from such non-utilitaristic 
principles should be used to detect and quantify the limits between solidaristic redistribution and the 
legitimate claim of production factors to obtain satisfying real disposable incomes (net of taxation)? 
Going out from the schemes of the normative theory of public intervention, the positive analysis of 
the motivations behind the impressing growth of social spending between '40s and '70s, and the 
analysis of subsequent preoccupations, expressed by scholars and political and economic operators, 
on the “unsustainability” of social spending, point out that the actual reference to “sustainability” 
became a way, only apparently technical, to recognize the existence of distributive conflicts in 
society between active-taxpayers and inactive-receivers of public social spending37. Worries about a 
possible worsening of such distributive conflicts certainly arise from the worsening of the (current 
and expected) growth rate of economies with older industrialization, because it enhances a 
“rationing” of demands. 
But, the reference to the “sustainability” of social spending contains an implicit value judgment, 
that is in a scenario of relatively smaller availability of resources, public social uses should have 
assigned a lower priority than private consumptions, even in comparison with unessential private 
consumptions. Assuming a different value judgment, it would appear legitimate – keeping the same 
arguments – to refer to a “sustainability” of unessential private consumptions38. 
 
 
 
3.  Choices for social spending policies 
 
The slowing down of average growth rates in countries with older industrialization, together with an 
uncertainty on the expected evolution for future years, reflect the growing competition from 
emerging economies and the increasing pressure from international demand on relatively scarce 
product inputs (energy commodities and other primary commodities, and from a perspective point 
of view, some environmental resources). No technological innovations are yet on the horizon which 
may be comparable to those that, during the industrialization in previous century, allowed to keep at 
bay the “specter of stationary state” depicted by Ricardo. 
It is therefore absolutely necessary, being forced to face current and expected lower growth rates for 
the general availability of goods and services, that the governments of advanced countries do care 
about favoring and stimulating increases in the average total productivity of factors, about directing 
resources to investments in innovation, about restructuring and converting productions, about 
rewarding labor productivity with proper wage incentives (net of mandatory fiscal contributions) 
while impeding a worsening of industrial relationships. With regards to such concrete 
preoccupations on technological and productivity growth and on qualitative enhancement of the 
production apparatus, it may seem unavoidable that social spending decisions are going to be 
determined, substantially, in a residual way. 
But this approach to social spending does not seem correct to me, even if ethical and ideological 
                                                 
37 As I hinted before, not the whole social spending is, strictly speaking, ascribable to the “inactives”, because a 
significant share of it is destined to form and increase human capital, which is a production factor. 
38 In advanced societies, there is an ample set of unnecessary consumptions which could be reduced to free resources 
that could then be destined to different allocations, such as to social spending. The objection is that such a choice 
would hurt consumer “sovereignty”, but this “sovereignty” expresses the wealth distribution, which is 
fundamentally exogenous to the neo-classical model, and it is widely considered by producers' policies, as described 
above in the text. A higher economic weight, in my opinion, is shown by the argument that possible reductions of 
consumptions of some unnecessary goods and services have to be carefully planned over time, as they involve 
significant reductions of the production activity for those sectors which provide them, and thus may bring negative 
consequences on income and employment in those sectors, during the transition to new allocative states. 
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reasons in favor of a solidarity and dignity of each person are to be put aside, to give absolute 
priority to objectives of national product growth. 
I already observed that a share of social expenditures is destined to contribute to education and to 
the improvement of human capital, a production factor of great relevance for the “competitiveness” 
of industrialized countries which are partially (or nearly totally) lacking of energy and other primary 
commodities, and socially unable to compete with emerging countries in the fields of monetary cost 
of labor and of a wild exploitation of natural resources. Industrialized countries may find in their 
quality of human capital their most important weapon to retain a central role in international 
productive specialization, in such a way to keep (at least) the high standards of living reached today 
for their people. 
It may be of interest to recall that one of the not strictly utilitarian principles of equity, which the 
scholars most convinced of a superiority of the market economy competitive model are mostly 
willing to accept, is the “equal opportunities” principle39. Indeed, it remains within the logic of the 
“efficient” competitive model to ask that all production factors are employed at their best capacity, 
in order to reach the technological frontier of productive possibilities. To achieve “equal 
opportunities”, even with a multitude of possible specific interpretations of such principle, it is also 
required a social spending (in a context which includes social mobility and recognition of individual 
merits) to offer equal opportunities to those who would be excluded due to an insufficient 
(household or individual) income. 
This contribution to the formation of a human capital and to “equal opportunities” allowing the 
most “efficient” use of all potentially available product factors, candidate a significant share of 
social spending to merit a higher priority between different (private and public) allocations of 
resources. But there is also another argument, applicable to all categories of social spending, which 
gives reasons for putting them on a high priority (if compared, for example, with unnecessary 
private consumptions) and even with regards to the objective – that cannot be disregarded today by 
European and other industrialized countries – of stimulating and favoring a productive growth of 
economy. I discussed this argument in a previous paragraph, where I noted that, at least in a 
majority of E.U. countries, large sectors of society consider social spending as a integral part of the 
“social pact” which resides at the base of the acceptance of market economy and public enforcing of 
private property of capital (both generating distributive inequalities in the power to command 
resources, in connection with an equality in political rights). This argument leads to conclude that 
social expenditures are a relevant factor of “sustainability” for the economic system organized as a 
market economy with privately owned means of production. 
The acknowledgment of a high priority level for social spending in socio-economic systems as 
those existent in E.U. countries, does not authorize to underestimate the importance and urgency of 
reviewing some choices and procedures of social spending policies today. At the beginning of this 
paragraph I highlighted how, in current conditions of globalization and growing tensions in regards 
to the supply of relatively scarce commodities, advanced countries should commit themselves to 
policies aimed at stimulating and favoring innovation and the efficient use of production factors 
within productive processes. Such commitment should certainly be extended to social policies. 
To this end, it seems appropriate to go back to the cited analysis by Lindbeck on the main factors 
which threaten the “sustainability” for social spending in E.U. and other industrialized countries. I 
already considered the effects of growing international interdependencies between economies in 
regards to the growth rates of such countries. These interdependencies also tend to rise the structural 
unemployment rate in traditionally advanced countries, and so they generate additional pressure on 
social spending demands, while the taxable wage base tends to shrink40. I believe the other factors 
of “menace” to social spending, as they have been pointed out by Lindbeck, merit further research 
in depth. 
                                                 
39 See MUSGRAVE (1959), pp. 19-20. 
40 See LINDBECK (2005), pp. 3-7. 
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3.1  The rising costs in the supply of human services, or “Baumol's Law” 
 
The assumptions upon which the well-known “Baumol's Law” (or “cost disease” for labor-intensive 
social services)41 are still verified in current advanced countries. Generally speaking, it appears 
technically hard to stimulate (through more capital and new technologies) increases of productivity 
in the supply of human services. Productivity dynamics of industrial sectors and of modern 
corporate services appear swifter, currently and in perspective, and their wage growth also lifts the 
low-productivity wages of human services42. 
Lindbeck defines “fallacious” the argument, sometimes proposed during political debates, 
according to which an increase of productivity in industrial and innovative sectors, since it  makes 
their taxable wage bases grow more rapidly, would allow a growing financing of the human service 
sector: “the intuitive reason is that a more rapid rate of productivity growth, and related real wage 
growth, in other sectors would, in fact, raise the wage costs for human services at the same rate as 
the tax base (still assuming the same path of wage rates in both sectors)”43. 
This objection by Lindbeck is unquestionable if the assumption is maintained that the entire 
increase of labor productivity is assigned to laborers, and that fiscal and contributive charging on 
their remunerations remains at a constant global tax rate. The assumption equals to assert the 
growth of labor productivity should be assigned so as to allow workers an increase of their 
expenditure capacity on private consumption markets. It is, therefore, a statement which contains 
precise “value judgments”. It is ideally (and ideologically) bound to the thesis of “consumer 
sovereignty”, based on the idea that an individual is the best judge of his interests. I already 
discussed many reasons to doubt this position44, which finds origin also in traditional trade unions' 
claims risen by the will to avoid enterprises to take possession of a share of the labor productivity 
growth, which would thus increase their share of profits45. But this “trade-union approach” cannot 
forget that there is not only the choice to assign labor productivity growth to wages (and so, mainly 
to private consumption) or to profits, there is also the choice between private and public 
consumptions (or redistributive public transfers). The “value judgment” according to which, in 
current Western societies, allocative and distributive objectives satisfied by social spending are 
priority in comparison with “utilitaristic” (individual) objectives which are satisfied by many of the 
expenses for unnecessary private consumptions, are at least as equally legitimate as those value 
judgments which suggest the thesis of “consumer sovereignty” on the structure of resource uses. 
Indeed, the strongest argument brought by union trades, in E.U. countries, is that workers of 
medium-low wage bands should not be the ones who finance the increasing costs for social 
services, through a cession of a share of the productivity rise ascribable to them. In this way, an 
issue on the distribution of taxation needed to finance social spending arises. 
Under this profile, it is true that current fiscal policy trends in industrialized countries, and 
especially in the E.U., do not appear favorable to the “sustainability” of increasing social 
                                                 
41 BAUMOL (1967); BAUMOL, WILLIAM, BLACKMAN, WOLFF (1985). 
42 The so-called “Baumol's Law” finds application also if a share of the human service, for example of the healthcare 
service, manages to take advantage of technological innovations (new pharmaceuticals or operative techniques) 
which rise the productivity rate: see BAUMOL, WILLIAM, BLACKMAN, WOLFF (1985); LINDBECK (2005). 
43 LINDBECK (2005), p. 8. 
44 Already in SIDGWICK (1891), cited in STEVE (1976). 
45 As detailed in the text, trade unions also claim that “fiscal wedges” between gross and net retributions should be 
reduced (or kept constant) burdening other income categories (from capital, mainly hitting the “rentier” elements; or 
from self-employed jobs) with possible additional fiscal charges. 
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expenditures46. Even inside the E.U., some aspects of “fiscal competition between States” persist 
(these would be strongly reduced by political agreements between member States) in a way that 
motivates a preference for income taxation structures rather than capital and corporate (for its 
capital component) taxation. It may be noted that, if the reference is to social spending financing, 
taxation of income alone with progressive tax rates47, which appears irrational according to the 
traditional logic of equity (horizontal and vertical), finds a rationale because it permits, at least 
(considering “impossible” to tax capital incomes more), to transfer resources to social uses 
burdening their financing to medium-high income workers, thus surpassing the objections brought 
forward to defend private consumptions of the lower incomes. 
It falls beyond the scopes of this work to go into fiscal policy choices. It will suffice to highlight the 
following: he who expresses the judgment (political, or of value) that social uses of resources 
should have higher priority than some other uses for private consumptions, may point out that the 
State has at its disposal enough technical instruments, above all the taxation of unnecessary 
consumptions (or, also, a progressive expenditure tax) to induce a transfer of resources to social 
allocations. 
A different question is if the majority electorates share, in the present historical period, such value 
judgments. Preferences of electorates are fluctuating over time, and frequent compromise solutions 
testify not only such uncertainty, but also a will to avoid dangerous political and social splits within 
each state. 
I think there is another aspect to be made clearer in current debates around social spending. The 
affirmation of a “costs disease” is sometimes explained together with the argument that, in public 
labor-intensive services supply, there is an insufficient commitment to work, as it would lack the 
competitive whip which stimulates productivity and efficiency in private enterprises and threatens 
less competitive firms with the outlook of bankruptcy, or of dismissals (it would also lack a logic of 
professional promotions driven by merit evaluation). To address these issues some authors 
proposed, for those public sectors where it is applicable, the introduction of  “internal market” 
organizations, in order to obtain freedom of choice of different “providers” for users/consumers, to 
define roles and opposing interests between purchasers and providers, and to force “providers” into 
a reciprocal competition. The attempts of this kind, which have been tried especially in the field of 
public supply of healthcare services, do not seem to give the expected results of higher productivity, 
allocative efficiency, innovation in technology and organization48. 
At the core of it, it was observed that the attempts to introduce a market logic into public sector 
clash against well-established (naturally and for self-interest) bureaucratic and dirigiste logics, 
favored (sometimes stealthily) by consolidated behaviors of political subjects. The crux of the 
matter is essentially political and cultural in nature, and related to a self-protection of particular 
interests: history shows that, for such aspects, cultural development is slow, even though in the long 
run it would appear to proceed, between discontinuities and some moving back. Analytically there 
is a point of contact with the problem of moral hazard (since laborers would simulate the work 
commitment agreed by contract), about which I discuss in the following 3.4. 
Last but not least: a comparison between private sector productivity, measured at market prices, and 
the productivity evaluated for services payed by the State, is not strictly homogeneous. In current 
economic systems it is easily observable that market prices do not match the ideal Pareto-efficient 
prices (this is true also for those who accept the utilitaristic Paretian formulation and the distribution 
                                                 
46 The thesis of LINDBECK (cit.) appears therefore verifiable in observable redistributive and income policies. The 
element I would like to stress here is that a fiscal alternative, technically feasible, to the “Baumol's Law” do exists, 
even if today it is politically losing. 
47 This is the solution adopted with the Scandinavian DIT, which today attracts favors and consensus from many 
authors of other E.U. countries. 
48 See, within a very large literature on the subject: ANELL (2005) for the Swedish experience; OLIVER (2005) for 
the English experience; NICITA (2003); COMPAGNONI (2005); CREMONESE (2008). 
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theory based on the marginal productivity of factors). A large body of literature exists on the 
divergences between prices and private costs, and between prices and social costs49. 
 
 
 
 
3.2  Deterrent effects caused by taxation to finance social spending 
 
In previous par. 3. I argued that choices between private and public allocations of resources are 
referable in the normative theory to value judgments, in concrete policies to contrasts in interests 
and collective evaluations which find mediations and syntheses through institutional procedures, 
and they end in public decisions which are accepted by electorates. 
Many authors warned that, facing the relevant growth of public social spending in the second half 
of the previous century, the high taxation (both marginal and average) required to finance social 
expenditures may discourage decisions to work, to save, to invest in risky assets. 
To the economist of neo-classical faith, any tax – with the exception of lump sum taxes – generate 
efficiency losses to economy, because they alter market prices for goods and factors which, in such 
model, have the task to send to economic agents the signals which drive them to Pareto-efficient 
choices. I already reminded how a part of the economic theory denies not only the practical 
relevance of this formulation (observed markets are far from the theoretic Pareto-efficient ones), but 
most of all, the logical validity of the distribution theory based on “efficient” relative prices upon 
which the neo-classical theory is founded. The statement according to which price distorting taxes 
cause allocative efficiency losses to the economy is, therefore, open to a number of criticisms. 
From the point of view of positive analysis on the effects of taxation risen to finance social 
spending, it cannot be denied that the reduction caused by taxes of the expected remuneration of an 
agent, as his reward for an economic act (labor, saving, investment), may induce him to revise his 
choice to perform such act, or to perform it in different quantities from those initially planned. 
To the social “policy-maker” this question presents itself in the form of a trade-off between social 
spending objectives and the keeping of incentives to economic activities, and at the time of 
intervention it becomes of utmost importance to know not only the sign, but also the dimension of 
possible deterrent effects. Unfortunately at present time we do not have at our disposal unequivocal 
and generally accepted estimates. As stated before50, some doubts on the dimensions for 
substitution effects caused by taxes, couple with income effects (almost always of the opposite 
sign). 
Between said doubts on the effects of deterrence, a conclusion which encountered ample consensus 
in literature regards public pension spending (generally financed by mandatory contributions on 
wages). It is stated that the passage from a “PAYG” system (repartition) to a “funded” system 
(capitalization) would increase the global supply of savings for the economy51. But, in a general 
equilibrium analysis, which appears necessary to analyze52 the effects of structural modifications of 
the economic system53, this statement is not immediately evident. PAYG systems were introduced 
to provide an answer to deep economic crises which put “funded” systems in the impossibility to 
accomplish their insurance functions: the “Great Depression” in the U.S., the consequences of the 
2° World War in many countries which are today E.U. members (especially inflation which 
destroyed the real values of Funds' reserves). It is hard to imagine which evolution might have 
                                                 
49 The contributions by MYRDAL (1953; 1958) are to be recalled, and before, VON WIESER (1889). 
50 See LINDBECK (2005), pp. 15 and sub. 
51 See in particular FELDSTEIN (1971; 1995; 1996; 2005). 
52 See LINDBECK (2005). 
53 Such is a passage from a repartition to a capitalization system, as in E.U. countries the payment of pensions absorbs 
around 15%-20% of national income. 
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resulted for the economy, and for aggregated savings, if laborers' pension expectations had not been 
satisfied through the introduction of public PAYG, because the alternative might have been a socio-
political crisis of the whole system. 
The reasons for PAYG systems introduction cannot be forgotten. Indeed, the most balanced 
proposals on their substitution with “funded “ systems also include significant public interventions, 
in order to avoid new financial crises which would undermine (social) stability for the general 
system: rules and controls on the activities of assurance pension Funds, fiscal incentives to the 
accumulation of provident savings, the keeping of a public pension “pillar” in a way to guarantee a 
basic protection for those who cannot insure themselves properly because of insufficient incomes or 
limited periods of regular work. 
Lastly, a point to stress is that while in the theoretical neo-classical model of balanced development 
the accumulation of saving translates, by hypothesis, in the accumulation of productive capital, in 
observable realities the conditions of disequilibrium prevail: the Keynesian lesson about the non-
automatic transformation of saving into productive capital remains topical54. 
Moreover, a deterrent effect on labor supply is ascribed to social spending. In some cases, as with 
PAYG models and especially if they provide a defined benefit (a given substitution ratio between 
pension and latest wage, or an average value), this effect may be relevant and determined by the 
existence of clauses by law, which provide anticipated pensioning or pension ages that do not 
correspond to population aging any more. The answer to this is found in modifications of the law, 
taking note of the fact that the prolongation of average life expectancy should, rationally, bring to a 
prolongation of the working period. 
In regards to the negative effects that subsidies (negative taxes) may exert on the unemployed (or on 
those who work marginally) who have the possibility to start a regular job, they belong 
conceptually to the field of “moral hazard” (on which see the following 3.4). 
 
 
 
3.3  The aging of populations 
 
One of the most frequently advanced arguments on the unsustainability of social spending, at trend 
figures, is the aging of populations, observed and expected for future decades on the basis of 
demographic projections55. 
It is said that the aging of populations forces governments to revise social spending policies, 
because their related legislations, designed and enacted when the ratio between active and inactive 
population was significantly higher than the current and expected ones, are not “sustainable” any 
more at current, significantly lower levels. These statements substantially hit pension policy choices 
and also healthcare policy, the latter in the sense that it includes long-term assistance and services to 
not (or partially not) self-sufficient elderly. 
In brief, by highlighting the aging process of industrialized countries' populations (especially in the 
E.U.) the aim is to declare “Beveridge models”, which are universal, all-comprehensive of every 
necessary service to the “needs” and measured against needs, and financed by general taxation, as 
not “sustainable” any more, particularly in the next decades. 
Many of the considerations expressed in previous paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 may be extended to the 
consequences of demographic changes on the “sustainability” of social spending. There is no doubt 
that, in a framework of slower growth of national product, distributive conflicts become acute, not 
only between production factors (wages, profits, interests and rents), but also on the distribution of 
                                                 
54 BROADBENT, GRANDE, THOMPSON, ZOLLINO (2006) noted that in 2000 there had been, in many E.U. and 
OECD countries, an increase in savings among firms, which was only partially invested in productive assets, 
because it was mainly destined to financial operations or to an accumulation of reserves. 
55 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2006, a and b). 
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production between active population, who participated to its creation, and inactive population 
because of malady or old age. The aging of population, since it increases the share of inactives and 
in need of medical and assistance expenditures, worsens this distributive issue56. 
But, this is not a problem which awaits a unique solution, nor a solution which is supposed to be 
preferred universally because of its objective superiority in comparison to the alternatives. Indeed, it 
is not an unchangeable rule the tendency to distribute the entire labor productivity growth to 
laborers in the form of higher disposable net wages (which presumably translate into higher private 
consumptions). Moreover, if the thesis here supported is accepted, that social expenditures are a 
fundamental part of the stability of socio-economic systems, also increases of capital productivity 
should contribute to their financing. The existence within real systems of extra profits and rents due 
to market imperfections may offer further opportunities to contribute to the financing of a growing 
social spending. 
Of course, if a variable of the economic systems continues to grow over time, faster than  
fundamental real variables and of GDP, in the long run (or in the very long term, which is quite 
difficult to forecast) a level of “unsustainability” will be reached. But the crucial choice for 
economic policy is the time when to stop the growth of such variable, because in regards to social 
spending, arresting its growth at a given time means to freeze the obtained income distribution, in 
other words it means to pick a precise solution to the distributive conflicts. In its nature, this choice 
is not different from that of an income policy which fossilizes at a given time the share of profits 
and wages (often according to the argument that salaries, when they grow more than labor 
productivity, erode the share of profits). What is the distributive income solution definable as 
economically “sustainable”? The answer is not unique, because it depends on evaluations, in a 
given historical time and country, of the relationships (political, cultural, contractual, etc.) between 
parts of society. 
The solution, currently supported by many authors, of a privatization (total or partial, with different 
grades) of public supply of pension transfers and medical services to old cohorts57, configures one 
of the possible distributive solutions (still, not the only one nor the most preferred by everyone), 
being based on evident “value judgments”. Equally legitimate – in the normative theory – appear 
those value judgments which assign a higher social priority to an employment of resources in favor 
of the old cohorts, to give them a dignified life and needed assistance, rather than employments in 
unnecessary and luxury consumptions, in speculative operations and in the accumulation – often 
fiscally privileged – of financial assets. 
Positive analyses of recent and current historical experiences show that distributive conflicts find, in 
real systems, compromise solutions (and so, unstable over time) between clashing interests and 
claims which animate social dialectics. In E.U. countries, the approval encountered by proposals of 
“two pillars” pension systems, one pillar based on private assurance for those who can afford to pay 
adequate contributions to their expected benefits58, and the other one, public, for those who do not 
have the income capacity required to “build” a future pension which is at least adequate to life 
needs, express the compromise solution between different “values”. 
                                                 
56 There are no technical shortcuts for the settlement of distributive conflicts. It is not a shortcut the passage of PAYG 
method to a “funded “ one, because at any time national product must be distributed between actives and retired, and 
the (potential or effective) conflict on the redistributive choice exists independently of the existing pension model. A 
different question is if it is possible to demonstrate the “funded” model, in comparison with PAYG model, increases 
global accumulation of capital and so it contributes more to the development of national product: this issue is 
discussed later. It appears of great importance the statement by LINDBECK (2005), p. 12, according to which if, at 
a given time, the rules on pensions should substantially result in a loss of income for some social groups, 
“irresistible political demands for an overhaul of the rules may emerge”. 
57 See for all FELDSTEIN (2005). 
58 Even within the ambit of PAYG model it is possible to introduce definitions of the pension treatment which are not 
correlated to the latest retributions with a fixed ratio, but instead determined according to the demographic trend and 
of the taxable wage base: an example is the “notional defined benefit” introduced in Sweden and later in Italy. 
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The contraposition between “value judgments” and the research for compromise solutions is 
evident also in medical policies: within “Beveridge” models a debate exists about spaces to be 
assigned to private assurance (and to “out of pocket” financing), to copayments for users, to a 
rationing of public provisions which are financed by general taxation. In the U.S. “privatistic” 
system, social pressures to enlarge the spaces of interventions of public programs (Medicare, 
Medicaid, SCHIP) are observed, and at least one political party asks for a substantial enlargement 
of the accessibility to healthcare services independently of personal income (and assurance). Within 
“Bismark” models, assurance and solidaristic components oppose and compose each other 
systematically59. 
I believe the acceptance by general public of solutions composing distributive conflicts (in this 
meaning I defined them as compromise solutions) may be eased by introducing in the debate, with 
more clarity, two observations and related proposals. The prolongation of the average life 
expectancy should be considered as a positive result, for society, due to economic and scientific 
progress, so it appears rational to charge its costs on society. It would seem equally rational that to 
the prolongation of average life expectancy, corresponds an increase of the pension age, because it 
would already slow down the effects of aging on pension spending dynamics. 
The second observation leads to previous considerations on the choice between redistribution in 
money or in kind. The impression is that facing an aging of populations, European States were 
caught unprepared, not only (and maybe not that much) on pension policies, but also (and maybe 
more) on the correction of the organizational social structures to peculiar needs of the growing 
share of old age population. Personal assistance (both in individual and collective form) to the not 
fully self-sufficient elderly, choices on urbanistic policies, of transports, trade, spare time, were all 
designed and realized for smaller shares of old age population, thought as being stable over time. 
I believe new meditations and choices, adequate to the aging of populations, are no less important 
than those on the financing of pensions and of additional medical services. 
 
 
 
3.4  Moral hazard 
 
Lindbeck60 (2005) observed that moral hazard and deterrent effects of taxation are the most 
dangerous threats to social spending, because they rise the possibility that the welfare State cuts the 
branch on which it sits. And the author notes how in Western Europe about one-fifth of active 
population (between 25 and 64 years old) lives thanks to social benefits of some sort (including 
prepensions): “In today's advanced welfare states, the choice between labor force participation and 
benefit dependency is largely an issue of moral hazard”. 
When moral hazard is realized, social spending is quantitatively higher than what it would be 
justified by its objectives, while the taxable wage base is correspondingly lower. I would add the 
menace of moral hazard to social spending comes not only from such quantitative effects, but also 
from the discredit thrown at it in the eyes of the taxpayers-voters, who are more easily induced to 
accept the theses (the value judgments) of those who evaluate the redistribution, stated by existing 
social rules, as being excessive. Within the dialectics of conflict on income distribution, references 
to moral hazard, when it is presumed to be large61, are a powerful weapon against the motivations 
                                                 
59 For the application in Germany of the “Bismark model”, but with strong solidaristic corrections, see GRAF VON 
DER SCHULENBURG (2005). For a survey and comparison between healthcare systems of the industrialized 
countries see OECD (2004, a and b). 
60 LINDBECK (2005), p. 3. 
61 See LINDBECK (2005), pp. 16-20, and the references cited in it. See also FONG (2000) who states the relevant 
impact of prevailing beliefs on redistributive policy choices. The belief that poverty is mainly generated by factors 
which are exogenous to an individual's will, or the opinion according to which poverty is mainly tied to a lack of 
commitment to work or to other types of behavior, are possible explanations of the differences in social spending 
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behind a high social spending. 
Many analyses are by this time available on cases of moral hazard observed in demands for social 
benefits, and so on possible measures to fight it. In brief, the conclusion is that the granting of some 
categories of benefits should be temporary, so as to be suspended when the recipient acquires again 
the capacity, or possibility, to work. The efficacy of some temporary clauses is, however,  
subordinate to the ability of the public body to enact recovery and requalification work programs, 
and of the economic policy to stimulate proper job opportunities. The efficacy of administrative 
controls is a requirement of such strategy against moral hazard. Controls become the main 
instrument when moral hazard is realized with the connivance of those who are supposed to verify 
the inability to work (i.e. doctors in charge), and to check the qualifications required to obtain a 
social benefit (such as true incomes, which often do not correspond to those fiscally assessed). In 
practice, it is evident how to “control the controllers” is always difficult (and costly), so the basic 
solution seems to be found in cultural progress of social sensitiveness (a theme for the ruling 
political classes and for mass media information). 
Some authors underline that the quantitative limitation of granted social benefits (lower generosity) 
is a good antidote to moral hazard, because it reduces the incentives to live thanks to the social 
benefit rather than on labor. On the other hand, this choice risks to make social benefits insufficient 
for those who are truly forced into poverty not because of their choice (without fault), but for 
exogenous unfavorable circumstances. 
Even better, a more extended use of transfers in kind, rather than in money, tends to reduce the area 
of possible moral hazard, because some of the services in kind cannot be transferred by the recipient 
to other people or to different kinds of consumption (for example, direct healthcare and assistance 
services cannot be transferred, excluding pharmaceuticals), and because services in kind may be 
declared non-transferable by law (for example, housing services through public housing)62. 
The case of prepensioning is often included in the moral hazard category. But, since in public 
pension systems the rules on pension ages are stated by law, the question lies on a collective 
(political) rather than individual choice. The law should set proper pension ages, and those who 
believe they cannot work until that age, for reasons related to health, should follow medical control 
procedures. 
Administrative controls are imperfect, costly and prone to abuses. But, saying that for such reasons 
an indiscriminate reduction of social spending is preferable, neglecting the reasons which motivate 
such expenditures, not only ethical but also (and mainly under a historical profile) of social 
equilibrium, seems to me a “hazard” toward political and economic reactions that the giving up of 
                                                                                                                                                                  
levels also according to ALESINA, ANGELETOS (2003), as already highlighted in previous note 30. This trend of 
research is based on the neo-classical normative theory, which justifies income redistribution between factors within 
a “perfect” competitive model as a function of their marginal productivity. Therefore, if real world economies work 
as described by the normative model, there is no need to redistribute incomes, since these would already be 
efficiently allocated by the market. A redistribution would only be acceptable for the agents' initial budgets, that 
means in real world, through a taxation of inheritances and taxes capable of affecting the “innate ability” of agents 
(see for example BOADWAY, 2004). For such reasons, if the prevailing opinion in a given society is that economic 
inequalities are mainly due to different levels of commitment of the agents (and not to differences in initial 
endowments) as it is verified under the hypothesis of moral hazard, that society will probably show less preference 
toward redistributive policies. As previously discussed in the main text, the same question is notably different if a 
not-neoclassical approach is considered according to which income distribution (even in a perfectly competitive 
model) is not legitimate by marginal productivity, but instead it expresses the outcome of social and political forces 
interaction. This question is relevant also to choose between pro-competitiveness labor market reforms. On the 
attempts and limits of such reforms, see the recent analysis by HOJ, GALASSO, NICOLETTI, THAI-THANH DANG 
(2006). 
62 Some authors compared the effects of transfers in money with those in kind on health services, in a model which 
allows information asymmetries and moral hazard. The conclusions are that healthcare transfers in kind (a public 
supply of medical services) may result preferable, even according to Paretian efficiency criteria: see MUNRO 
(1992) and the authors cited in it. 
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social policy objectives may cause. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The existing worries about the causes which tend to increase – legislations unchanged – ratios 
between social expenditures and GDP in a great share of industrialized countries, and especially in 
the E.U., are certainly justified. In forecast scenarios which anticipate a slowing down of old 
industrialization countries' growth, the aging of populations, a positive elasticity of medical services 
demand to income, the low dynamics of productivity in the production of human services, are 
factors which tend to significantly rise the GDP share destined to recipients, to the detriment of the 
(not subsidized) actives and of the beneficiaries of other public expenditures. The expectation that 
such a disadvantageous process for active laborers is destined to last over time, at least in the short-
medium term, suggests the possibility that new and more serious distributive conflicts may start. 
Moreover, it is argued that at current, already historically high levels of taxation, further increases 
to finance social spending would amplify deterrent effects on labor supply, on saving, and on 
investment and risk-bearing choices. 
The common phenomenon of “moral hazard” for the beneficiaries of social interventions (the 
number of which may be growing over time because of a “learning by doing”) would worsen the 
issues related to the control of expense dynamics, it would discourage recipients from entering back 
the active workforce, and it would place the “ethical and altruistic” reasons for the taxpayers' 
sacrifice (the burden to finance such social redistributions) in an unfavorable light. 
These arguments have qualitative importance and quantitative weight. However, they must be 
compared to the motivations which gave impetus to social policies, as they also keep importance 
and weight. Within the normative theory, it has been a long time since “ethical” principles based on 
the recognition of a person's dignity – which must also be an economic dignity - have been opposed 
against the individualistic utilitarian approach. Positive analyses state the roots of social spending 
are found in the “social pacts”, which united and unite citizens on the assumption of equality in 
political rights and acceptance of inequalities in the rights to command resources. But the 
acceptance of economic inequalities is conditioned to the taking on social policies objectives, which 
limit and correct such inequalities. Social expenditures, therefore, make market economy systems 
with public protection of private property of capital “sustainable”. 
Under modern conditions, the slower growth of countries with a consolidated industrialization and 
higher comparative qualities of life, and the expectations for a difficult recovery of growth rates 
observed in the past, impose to such countries a restructuring and rearrangement of their production 
systems, with a swifter innovation and diffusion of technological progress, severe restrictions to the 
areas of inefficiency and of unearned incomes. They also impose to innovate social policy 
formulation and management to obtain higher efficiency and better matching between interventions 
and real needs of the beneficiaries. 
But, worse current and expected economic conditions for traditionally more advanced countries, do 
not require them to leave or significantly reduce (privatizing) the objectives of social spending, thus 
safeguarding de facto an increase of unnecessary private consumptions. The matter is to propose a 
choice for the scale of priority of available resources allocations. Such choices are necessarily 
founded on “value judgments”, or political judgments, of which proposing scholars and policy-
makers have to bear the responsibility. 
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